Insider Threats, Paperback

High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders--trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.Contributors
Matthew Bunn, Harvard University
Andreas Hoelstad D hli, Oslo
Kathryn M. Glynn, IBM Global Business Services
Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Oslo
Austin Long, Columbia University
Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University
Ronald Schouten, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School
Jessica Stern, Harvard University
Amy B. Zegart, Stanford University

Matthew Bunn is Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is coeditor of Transforming U.S. Energy Innovation. Scott D. Sagan is Caroline S. G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is coeditor of Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons, also from Cornell, and the author of The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, among other books.